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BOOK NOTE
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY: A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK
FOR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AuDACIous JUDGES. By
Charles M. Haar.' Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp.
XiV, 266. $29.95.
In Suburbs Under Siege: Race, Space, and Audacious Judges,
Charles M. Haar advocates intense judicial activism in the narrow
subset of cases that qualify as "institutional reform litigation."2 He de-
scribes the history and effects of New Jersey's Mount Laurel decisions 3
and showcases the New Jersey Supreme Court's stance in those cases
as a model of "audacious" judicial activism in the field of exclusionary
zoning. Although many of Haar's descriptions and arguments impli-
cate public choice theory,4 he unfortunately fails to draw on it to pro-
vide a coherent theoretical framework for understanding his empirical
data and integrating his analysis.5
Much of Haar's book describes the Mount Laurel exclusionary
zoning cases from 1975 to the present (pp. 16-126). Like many subur-
ban towns, Mount Laurel, New Jersey had a zoning ordinance that, by
its terms, made construction of low- or moderate-income housing
within the town's limits very difficult, if not impossible.6 In Mount
Laurel I, the local NAACP chapter brought suit challenging the ordi-
nance as exclusionary and invalid.7 Mount Laurel I was an ideologi-
cal breakthrough: the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the state
constitution to require every municipality, "by its land use regulations,
presumptively [to] make realistically possible an appropriate variety
and choice of housing."" The court's holding was sweeping, but it did
1 Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
2 Although Haar does not explicitly define this term in his book, he apparently refers to
litigation that seeks to remedy widespread lawbreaking by a governmental institution.
3 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
'975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]; Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]; Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of
Bernards, 5IO A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III]. This Book Note refers to this
series of cases together as the Mount Laurel cases.
4 Public choice theory utilizes economic theory to explain political behavior. See DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11, at 1 (1989).
5 Haar's advocacy of intense judicial activism is also subject to objections on separation-of-
powers grounds (pp. 130-37). However, discussion of these arguments is beyond the scope of this
Book Note.
6 See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 729 (N.J. 1975).
7 See id. at 716-17.
8 Id. at 724.
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not specify how municipalities should meet this requirement (pp.
26-27). Unsurprisingly, communities failed to respond to the decision. 9
In 1983, the court again addressed the lack of local efforts to pro-
vide affordable housing in New Jersey's suburbs.' 0 The court adopted
the key idea of "regional welfare," which required localities to provide
housing that would meet their "fair share" of regional need as contem-
plated by a statewide development plan (P. 38). It also established a
specialized three-member judiciary, aided extensively by special mas-
ters, that would specifically deal with Mount Laurel cases (pp. 43-44).
Finally, the court created an extraordinary builder's remedy, whereby
"if a builder successfully demonstrates that a municipality's land-use
regulation is exclusionary, and promises to deliver a substantial
number of low-income housing units, that builder is granted permis-
sion to build additional market-priced units over and above the nomi-
nal number permitted by the zoning ordinance" (pp. 44-45).
In response to the judiciary's activism, the New Jersey legislature
passed the Fair Housing Act" (FHA) in 1985 (pp. 92-94). The FHA
created the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), an administrative
agency empowered to administer Mount Laurel obligations.'2
Although it upheld the constitutionality of the FHA,' 3 the court criti-
cized COAH's actions in subsequent cases in which the agency failed
to pursue its mission with the necessary vigor (p. 117).14
Haar describes the evolution of the Mount Laurel cases in great
detail, with a focus on the effects of Mount Laurel II and the efficacy
of the new Mount Laurel judges and special masters (pp. 55-86). He
describes the judges' prestige within the New Jersey legal community
(pp. 55-56), the underlying uniformity of their decisions (p. 67), the
commitment of both the judges and the masters to the goals of the
Mount Laurel opinions (pp. 85-86), and their effectiveness in crafting
viable remedies to attain more affordable suburban housing (p. 13i).' 5
This description illustrates Haar's radical thesis: that state judiciaries
can be effective agents of institutional reform through intense activism
9 See Mount Laurel 1I, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (NJ. 1983).
10 See id.
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-3oi (West x996).
12 See id. § 52:27D-3o5, -307.
1- See Mount Laurel III, 51o A.2d 623, 633, 642 (N.J. 1986).
14 Haar characterizes In re Petition for Substantive Certification Filed by the Township of
Warren, 622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 3993), and Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d
277 (N.J. I9go), as examples of the New Jersey Supreme Court's "continued and rigorous protec-
tion" of the Mount Laurel doctrine (p. 137).
15 For example, Haar cites zoning revisions allowing for the construction or rehabilitation of
54,000 additional low- and moderate-income housing units in New Jersey suburbs between 1987
and 3992, 75% of which were formulated under the Mount Laurel courts' supervision (p. 13).
But cf. John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine:
Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. Rxv. 665, 667-80 (x996) (describing two major stud-
ies of Mount Laurel housing that show an increase in affordable housing but criticizing the deci-
sions' inefficacy in achieving racial integration and voluntary compliance).
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(pp. 184-85). Further, Haar argues that, in cases of institutional re-
form litigation, the judiciary should assume an intensely activist, "au-
dacious" role, as had the New Jersey Supreme Court (pp. 184-85).
In order to make his prescription more concrete, Haar proposes
five prerequisites for audacious judicial activism (p. 184). The first
three requirements ensure that radical judicial intervention will not be
undertaken lightly. "Law-breaking by the state or a unit of the state"
must exist; the "illegality [must] affect[ ] a sizable segment of social life,
with a detrimental impact on the legal interests of an indefinitely large
number of persons";16 and the wrongdoing must not be "isolated but
systematic, indicating a persistent pattern of law-breaking over time"
(p. 184). Haar's last two requirements reveal his concerns regarding
the limits of the majoritarian branches' capacity to deal with institu-
tional lawbreaking. In order to warrant audacious judicial activism,
the lawbreaking involved must "violate[ ] a constitutional provision,
not simply an ordinary law," because Haar assumes that the legisla-
ture will correct violations of ordinary laws through statutory amend-
ments (p. 184 & n.12). 1 7 Finally, the wrongful practice must be
"entrenched" and likely to "project itself into the future," and the exec-
utive and legislative branches must be unwilling and unable to correct
it (p. 184).'8
By limiting the application of audacious activism to cases in which
both the norms of group behavior and the traditional structure of
political institutions inhibit reform, Haar sets the stage for utilizing a
framework culled from public choice theory literature. In particular,
Haar's argument is informed by public choice theory's understanding
of the negative incentives that inhibit legislators and executive officials
from undertaking institutional reform. Furthermore, Haar's support of
the post-Mount Laurel 11 judiciary's activism can be integrated into a
public choice framework by explaining how this kind of activism over-
comes traditional arguments against courts as institutional reformers.
An explicit public choice theory framework would also have provided
a theoretical companion to Haar's meticulous description of the Mount
Laurel cases and their progeny.
16 This criterion implicates the public choice notion of the collective action problem. See
MUELLER, supra note 4, at 307-19. If the illegality affects a large group, free-ridership will hinder
the motivation and organization of individuals necessary to achieve the collective goal of remedia-
tion. See id. at 310.
17 Under public choice theory analysis, this assumption is of questionable validity. Rather,
corrections of statutory law would depend upon the political incentives of legislators and execu-
tive officers.
18 Other possible instances of institutional reform litigation calling for audacious activism in-
clude school desegregation, large-scale environmental clean-up, and prison reform. Haar's theory
will apply to these situations as well so long as his criteria are satisfied. The usefulness of public
choice theory as a bulwark for Haar's theory extends to these areas as well, because his final
criterion presupposes that legislative and executive incentives mitigate against reform.
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In particular, public choice theory provides support for Haar's the-
sis of legislative and executive inadequacy to rectify exclusionary zon-
ing on both the local and state levels. Local governmental institutions
in suburbs with exclusionary zoning ordinances lack the proper incen-
tives to address problems like the affordable housing shortage. 19
Popularly elected city council members and mayors would risk losing
their seats if they proposed the repeal of exclusionary zoning, because
their constituents - current residents - are those most vehemently
opposed to changes in zoning laws.20 This attitude is not necessarily
the result of any invidious motives of suburbanites.2' Rather, it is
often traceable to their concern for maintaining property values,22 pre-
serving the balance of property tax rates and the level of amenities
provided to residents, 23 and protecting the community from excessive
development.
Members of the state legislative or executive branches will also
find it difficult to champion proposals to ban exclusionary zoning.
Like town officials, legislators from suburban districts are constrained
by the preferences of their constituents. Urban legislators also have
little incentive to legislate against exclusionary zoning.24 Legislators
from rapidly decaying inner cities may have more immediate legisla-
tive goals than the health of the affordable suburban housing market;
even if urban constituents made strong appeals to their legislators for
action on this issue, legislators might hesitate to advocate a policy that
would enable their grateful constituents to leave their districts. 25 Even
governors, who are charged with safeguarding statewide interests, are
under pressure not to push reforms unpopular with suburbanites.2 6
19 See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. Rxv. 959, 961 (xgi) (describing the public
choice theory assumption that political officials and their constituents make decisions to improve
their personal welfare).
20 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 126 (x985) (arguing that
"[t]he political power of the suburb ... is entirely in the hands of current residents" and that local
governments are responsive to "the preferences of the median voter'; cf. Robert P. Inman &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1662, 1671
(1979) ('In the suburbs,... the taxing and spending levels set by the winning majority are likely
to correspond closely to the preferred taxing and spending levels of all community residents.'). Of
course, local government is an imperfect system and may be dominated by special interests. See,
e.g., Gillette, supra note I9, at 978 (suggesting that, due to collective action problems among
residents, local governments will select a suboptimal allocation of public goods in zoning decisions
by catering to developers, who have "the greatest capacity to make their preferences heard').
21 This is not to say that racial and economic prejudice does not play a role, explicit or im-
plicit, in creating exclusionary zoning rules. See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF Ex.
CLUSION 7, 11-12 (1976).
22 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 20, at x685-86.
23 See id. at 1685 (describing suburban residents' rational desire to exclude potential owners
of residences with lower property values in order to keep tax rates low).
24 See FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 318.
25 See id.
26 See Stephen Clutter, Governor Candidates to Battle for Suburbs, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 25,
i996, at Bi (describing the importance of suburban voters in Washington's x996 gubernatorial
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Further, the political return on action against exclusionary zoning is
questionable even from urban constituents, because they may move to
the suburbs and adopt the suburban attitudes supporting exclusionary
zoning. In sum, Haar could have organized and strengthened his
claims of executive and legislative incapacity to initiate reforms by
drawing on public choice theory.
By using an explicit public choice theory framework, Haar would
also have unified his arguments that the Mount Laurel II model of
judicial activism can overcome the traditional obstacles to effecting in-
stitutional reform through the courts (pp. 133-37). The traditional ju-
diciary seems ill-suited to implement institutional reform. First, judges
tend to be generalists: they preside over many types of cases, gaining
only incidental expertise in the diverse fields upon which lawsuits
touch. This generalist experience and the adversarial system under
which traditional judges operate frustrate judges' ability to remedy
complex institutional lawbreaking effectively (pp. 136-37). Second, the
traditional judiciary's inability to initiate legal claims renders it pas-
sive.27 Further, in the zoning context, the judiciary's attempts at insti-
tutional reform may be frustrated by communities' use of alternative
strategies to exclude low-income residents. 28 Given the serious obsta-
cles the traditional judiciary faces in initiating and implementing re-
forms, institutional reform may seem best suited for the legislature or
the executive.2 9 Haar's book, however, posits that audacious courts
overcome these traditional difficulties and become effective institu-
tional reformers (pp. 182-85).
In the Mount Laurel cases, the appointment of specialized judges
(P. 44) and reliance on planning professionals, serving as special mas-
ters, to craft viable remedies (pp. 73-76) addressed the problem of
generalist judges, unschooled in the intricate administrative problems
raised in institutional litigation. The creativity of the Mount Laurel
cases also responded to the traditional judiciary's passivity problem.
Exclusionary zoning laws are unlikely to be litigated in a traditional,
passive court system, because those most adversely affected by these
election); cf. Jeffrey A. Roberts, Parties Tuning in to Suburbs' Hopes, DENVER POST, Aug. 25,
1996, at iA (noting that approximately 58% of Colorado's voting-age population lives in the
suburbs).
27 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1283 (1976); Gillette, supra note ig, at 992 ("Judicial process is not self-executing; judicial
intervention occurs only when a local act is challenged.").
28 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 20, at 1739. For example, even if the courts can cor-
rect exclusionary zoning laws, suburbs may increase taxes to make relocation less feasible or re-
duce the level of services to make it less desirable for lower-income families. See id. at 1739-40.
The pressures of competition among suburbs for desirable residents may exacerbate this reaction.
See id. at I744. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416, 416-24 (1956) (outlining the original theory of competition among suburbs to
attract consumer-voters); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 529-33 (3d ed. 1992) (updating
Tiebout's theory).
29 See, e.g., Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 2o, at 1748-50.
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ordinances - potential residents unable to move to the suburbs -
usually do not have standing to sue.30  By establishing the builder's
remedy, the court made future litigation more likely by giving an indi-
vidual with standing a strong economic incentive to sue (p. 45).3'
Moreover, by characterizing the provision of affordable housing as an
affirmative obligation on all communities, the New Jersey judiciary
virtually assured liability for any suburb sued nonfrivolously.3 2 By in-
creasing the chances of litigation's success, this characterization en-
hanced builders' incentives to sue and made such suits a stronger
threat to local governments. Haar's arguments for an audacious judi-
ciary would have benefitted from explicit analysis of the ways incen-
tives and institutional structure affect the behavior of government
actors. Public choice theory offers such an analysis.33
Suburbs Under Siege is a valuable resource as a description of
Mount Laurel and its progeny in New Jersey and as a thoughtful anal-
ysis of the issues involved in exclusionary zoning cases generally.
However, the absence of a unifying theoretical framework undermines
the force of Haar's argument. Haar's call for judicial activism could
have been strengthened by utilizing public choice theory to support his
claim that an "audacious" judiciary is the "one government agency
able to act" as a successful institutional reformer (p. ii).
30 Such potential residents may also suffer from lack of information and collective action
problems.
31 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 20, at 1686 (noting the economic incentive for develop-
ers to build high-density housing).
32 "By the time litigation begins ... there is general agreement that the administrative branch
of government has botched the handling of a social need or, in the Mount Laurel situation, that
the locality is engaged in exclusionary zoning practices that violate constitutional demands. Lia-
bility is not the issue" (p. 153).
33 Even audacious activism may not address alternative methods that suburbs may use to
exclude outsiders. Audacious courts theoretically could attack such practices, given that they
probably also fit Haar's prerequisites for such activism. However, implementing such intense
activism on so many fronts will be extremely difficult in practice.
Also, audacious judicial activism suffers from the criticism that judges lack accountability to
the electorate and effective power to enforce their activist judgments. Moving to a system of
elected judges might address the accountability problem; however, it might also chill judicial ac-
tivism by giving judges exactly those incentives that make their intervention necessary. The en-
forcement problem may be mitigated by activist judges who are willing to revisit issues over time
and use all of the tools at their disposal - including remedial orders, police intervention, and
special masters - to craft creative enforcement solutions that can effectively bring about the
desired changes.
1166 [Vol. ixoio:t6
